Investigators and members of the National
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the jet age in 1958, commercial air travel accident rates began a precipitous decline (Sears, 1989) , but by the early 1970s the decline leveled off and has remained low but nearly constant. Because of jet aircraft systems' reliability and redundancy, accidents due primarily to mechanical failure are rare. The human system failure, the pilot, is the causal factor in more than seventy percent of commercial airline accidents (Lautman and Gallimore, 1987) .
Researchers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in the early 1970's, began studying approaches to effect further improvements in airline safety and concluded that the root causes of pilot error accidents must be addressed if the accident rate were to be further lowered. Contemporaneously, flight operations managers at United Airlines came to similar conclusions as a result of their investigations at United and other airlines. One accident, which has since become a classic in the study of pilot error, galvanized support for a different type of training for United's pilots. This new approach to pilot training, now commonly termed Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), has been adopted by many airlines in an effort to further improve airline safety. This paper explores the foundations of CRM training and its prospects for success. CRASH OF UNITED FLIGHT 173 In December, 1978, United Flight 173, a DC-8 aircraft on a scheduled passenger flight from Denver to Portland, Oregon crashed after the crew delayed their approach and landing to work on an unsafe landing gear indication. The flight was routine until the gear extension was accompanied by a loud thump, abnormal vibration, aircraft yaw, and a red warning light for the right main landing gear. Following established procedure for this abnormality, the flight engineer confirmed all main landing gear were down and locked by a visual inspection system designed for that purpose. Some twenty-eight minutes after reporting the gear problem to Portland air traffic controllers, the captain contacted United's dispatch and maintenance center controllers to discuss the problem. All agreed that the appropriate procedures had been completed. The conversation ended approximately 30 minutes before the aircraft crashed. For the remainder of the flight, the captain's primary concern seems to have been to allow the flight attendants time to prepare the cabin for an the organizational development firm founded emergency landing.
by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton. These During that time, both the first officer and managers were quick to note the similarity in flight engineer made several oblique and the problems of business management unassertive references to the increasingly addressed by this training and those involved critical fuel situation. So oblivious was the in the crash of United 173. Accordingly, captain to those comments that when the first Scientific Methods was asked to develop a of four engines quit and the first officer said, similar program for United's pilots (Oberle, IIWe're losing an·-engine ll , the captain asked, -..1990). Although United was not the first airline IIWhy?1I The crew managed to keep the to implement management training for pilots, remaining three engines running for another its initial commitment to CRM training was the seven minutes; the DC-8 crashed six miles greatest, making United the industry leader in from the runway after the remaining fuel was this area. exhausted and all engines flamed-out (NTSB, Laboratory Education in Business 1979).
Blake and Mouton were the developers of the For many, the crash exemplified what was Managerial Grid for assessing leadership styles wrong with airline pilots and their approach to and were early proponents of laboratory teamwork in the cockpit. Foushee and education in business. Intensive group Helmreich (1988) have argued that both experience education, known variously as Ttraditional pilot selection and training are, in group, encounter group, sensitivity training, part, responsible for these deficiencies. They and laboratory education, was developed and point out that many airlines have long favored extensively employed in many companies for the military single-seat fighter pilot for hiring, the two decades following World War II the type immortalized by Tom Wolfe (1979) as (Kaplan, 1986) . having The right stuff. IIMost of us are familiar In the earliest stages, managers from different with the common stereotype of the pilot as a companies or work areas were assembled in fearless, self-sufficient, technically qualified, training groups but not provided with any and slightly egotistical individual, whose job specific direction or given any explicit task. The description calls for the defiance of death on a role of the educator or facilitator was not to regular basis·· (Foushee and Helmreich, 1988 provide structure but rather to encourage the p 191). Pilots who have this background and group members to identify and communicate self-image are unlikely to function well in the their feelings about the group, its work as it multi-pilot crew when there is a need for evolved, and its members. This feedback was teamwork and group decision processes. considered the most important product of the While Foushee and Helmreich may have process (Argyris, 1964) . The objective was to overestimated the extent to which this develop an ability for Ilopenness·1 which the personality type is evident in airline cockpits, manager could then use on the job. Later some of the attitudes to which they refer are developments included the use of interactive common (Helmreich, 1984) .
work groups and the introduction of a series of DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY more structured tasks for the group to perform. EDUCATION FOR PILOTS Current methods for the management-team-At the time of the accident, some United building aspect of organizational development managers were participating in a training are direct results of initial work in laboratory program provided by Scientific Methods, Inc., education (Lewis, 1975) . Regardless of the training method advocated, scholars and practitioners believed that controlling, autocratic leadership styles, to the exclusion of relationships within the group, were counterproductive (Horstein, Heilman, Mone, and Tartell, 1987) . Laboratory education was intended to heighten sensitivity to the importance of relationships. -~Underlying .teamwork --values· were the free flow of valid information, a spirit of inquiry, nondefensiveness, and collaboration. These qualities seemed the perfect prescription for avoiding accidents like the Portland crash. CRM Training at United Airlines The United CRM program uses the Managerial Grid as the basis for examining individual leadership style. The Managerial Grid allows for various management styles to be depicted on coordinate system where the X axis measures concern for production or task behavior with the V axis showing concern for people or relationship behavior. The course introduction states that when the grid is Ilunderstood it provides a comparative basis for seeing teamwork and how individuals contribute to it or prevent it from occurring by the way in which they interact with one another-I (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 3 ). This emphasis is necessary because Iwell-educated and technically proficient crew members . . . rarely understand what makes people tick. 11 (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 2) . Vet the skills in working with other crew members are essential to Ilreaching informed, strategically sound decisions and taking action accordingly.11 (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 1) .
Objectives of the course are five: (a) gain insight into one's own style of action, (b) set standards for advocacy and inquiry based on openness and candor, (c) learn effective use of the captain's authority and crew member leadership, (d) develop principles of synergistic teamwork, and (e) understand the impact of external forces on cockpit behavior.
Small teams of pilots work together intensely for three and a half days on a series of projects. This teamwork allows participants to develop skills in inquiry, advocacy, conflict solving, decision making, and critiqueing. The developers say these skills will not be taught but will develop through group interaction. At the end of the session, team members evaluate each other's strengths and weaknesses. This sometimes harsh evaluation by peers is intended to promote reflection and lead to' a change of attitude and behavior.
CRM Training at Other Airlines
Cockpit resource management training, though not yet required by regulation, has been introduced in some form at most major airlines. Many programs are patterned after United's course and most programs use some form of leadership style assessment and group feedback. EFFICACY Despite wide acceptance by the airline industry and ten years experience in CAM training, there is no conclusive evidence this training is effective in improving flight safety. Certainly pilot-error accidents continue to occur. Nevertheless, an accident is such a low frequency occurrence that a short-term change in the accident rate will not be statistically significant in proving the efficacy of training. Some anecdotal evidence, however, has been offered. United, which had not had a hull-loss accident since beginning its training program in 1979, suffered two accidents in 1989. One, a Boeing 747 on climb out of Honolulu lost a forward cargo door resulting in serious flight control problems and several passengers being sucked through the gaping hole in the fuselage. The second occurred when the center engine of a DC-1 0 aircraft exploded in flight, resulting in severe control problems and a spectacular televised crash landing at Sioux City, Iowa. Both captains credited their crews' CRM training for reducing the loss of life in these accidents (Langer, 1990) . Still, this testimony is not considered hard statistical evidence and the vested interest of United Airlines must be acknowledged.
Helmreich ' (1984) . . has argued· that -0-CRM training programs may be effective in changing pilot attitudes but are unlikely to affect underlying personalities. Further, there is evidence that personality is linked to pilot performance, including cockpit management. If personality is the predominant determinant of cockpit management behavior, then airline managers should concentrate on pilot selection rather than on training and allow cockpit management to gradually improve with the retirement of those pilots with inappropriate personality traits.
In research at one airline, however, Helmreich has found that attitudes toward cockpit management differ significantly by pilot position, i.e. captain, first officer, second officer. Because personality traits were not similarly linked to position, it would seem that personality traits and attitudes toward cockpit management are independent. In subsequent research at the same carrier, a significant correlation between attitudes and flight deck performance in cockpit management was found (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, and Russini, 1986) . CRM training has been shown to have a positive influence on pilot attitudes both as measured by pilots' subjective evaluation of the usefulness of the training and by psychological testing administered pre-and post-training (Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee, Gregorich, and Wilhelm, 1989) . If CRM training is effective in changing pilots' attitudes, it should have a positive effect on actual cockpit management.
Helmreich and his colleagues reported preliminary results indicating CRM training does translate to improved cockpit management behaviors in actual and simulated flight (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, & Chidester, 1990) . The researchers face several methodological problems. Perhaps the greatest difficulty is in obtaining consistency of evaluation from the pilots measuring cockpit management performance. Although the degree of efficacy is yet to be determined, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (1989), sufficiently convinced that CRM training will be effective in improving safety, has proposed such training for all airline pilots. CRITICISMS There has been no research on the best pedagogical methods for CRM training. This lack of evidence notwithstanding, there are reasons to question whether programs which place a heavy emphasis on leadership style assessment, feedback, and introspection are likely to be effective in improving airline safety. These questions involve (a) the underlying analysis of the causes of pilot error accidents, (b) the dissimilarity in the working roles of airline pilots and business managers, and (c) the history of ineffectiveness of laboratory training in business. Questionable Analysis Though not ignoring other combinations of task and relationship attitudes and behaviors, much current CRM thinking stresses the problem combination of the autocratic, taskoriented captain and the timid, unassertive subordinate crewmembers as in the case of the crew of United 173. Thus, much of the emphasis is on the concern for people or the relationships dimension of management style. Data suggests that many pilot-error accidents involve failures in areas which are the domain of traditional pilot training programs. In a study of fatal air carrier accidents worldwide from 1977 through 1988, Sears (1989) found that deviations from standard operating procedures were a significant factor in thirty-seven percent.
Training and practice of standard operating procedures for both normal and abnormal situations constitutes a large portion of traditional pilot training. In its investigation of two recent accidents resulting from the failure of the flight crews to properly set flaps for takeoff (Northwest at Detroit and Delta at Dallas), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (1988, 1989) found in both cases the captains failed to maintain cockpit discipline and follow standard operating procedures.
In another study conducted at Boeing Aircraft, Lautman and Gallimore (1987) found that twelve percent of all commercial aircraft operators accounted for ninety percent of all accidents. Although the study was not scientifically based, a series of interviews showed that standardization and cockpit discipline was a common element of those operators with the best safety records.
In an early study, Sears (1986) found a lack of technical knowledge and/or basic flying skills to be a contributing factor in approximately thirty percent of air carrier accidents (Table 1) . These findings suggest that more emphasis should be placed on task behavior in CAM training.
Dissimilarity of Pilot and Management Teams
To the extent that the importance of relationships should also be stressed in CRM training, there is reason to question whether group exercises are an effective means of doing so. Since laboratory education was designed to address the problems of openness in management teams and CRM training draws directly on this foundation, significant differences between the work of management and pilot teams may invalidate assumptions about the transferability of the training.
Both by tradition and federal law, an airline captain has absolute authority over the operation of his/her crew and the aircraft. A manager has similar responsibilities though perhaps more limited authority. For most situations the similarity ends here. For all normal flying situations, procedures for aircraft operations are highly developed, specific in detail, and intended to be precisely followed. The same is true for all abnormal conditions which have been anticipated. Traditional pilot training emphasizes rote learning and practicing of these procedures. In contrast, high level management teams operate in a world of much less certainty, in longer time horizons, and in environments over which management has little control. Lewis (1975) delineates the conditions most favorable for the operation of integrated management teams most likely to benefit from team development training. Among those conditions are: (a) An external environment that is highly variable and/or changing rapidly; (b) an organization which is young and/or undergoing major change, which results in fluid structure, -few operating policies and procedures, and emerging role definitions; (c) technology that is relatively new and/or developing rapidly; and (d) a tendency towards frequent use of project management, temporary task forces, and/or ad hoc problemsolving groups to augment conventional organizational structures. These conditions are not characteristic of the airline pilot's job, and by extension, team building may be inappropriate. To the contrary, Argyris (1964) acknowledges that directive style leadership is appropriate for routine decisions and extreme emergencies. These, in fact, are exactly the working conditions faced by airline pilots. A well-known adage among pilots characterizes their job lias hours and hours of boredom interspersed with moments of sheer terror. 11 Continuity is an additional significant difference between· management teams and airline crews. Whereas management team members can be expected to take some time to get to know one another, develop working relationships, and then work together for an extended period, it is common for airline pilots to meet for the first time and one hour later to have to function as a highly integrated team performing a complex task. At larger airlines, it is also common for a crew to work together for one month and then possibly never again. Such teamwork can be accomplished only by adherence to detailed standard operating procedures.
Effectiveness of Laboratory Training in Business
Laboratory training programs for management, which are the basis for many CRM programs, eventually proved disappointing even to their advocates. Chris Argyris (1979) , who championed the cause of laboratory education for many years, eventuallỹ concluded l'there may be factors endemic to the theory and practice of the laboratory education that act to inhibit transferabilityll (p.197). Kaplan (1986) concludes that laboratory training failed for two reasons: (a) Some participants were hurt in the process and their working relations damaged, and (b) those who felt positive about the process were generally unable to apply what they had learned in the training. There is evidence that both of these problems are results of current CRM training. Although reporting a positive shift in attitudes by most pilots participating in CRM programs, Helmreich, et al (1989) have found a negative reaction in about fifteen percent of those trained. The data indicate those pilots reacting most negatively are low in both task and relationships on the grid measurement system. These are the pilots judged to be most in need of improvement. While the developers of the United CRM program deny it, elements of T-group and sensitivity training are certainly involved (Public Broadcasting System, 1986) . During a sales presentation of the course to this author, the Scientific Methods representative explained with apparent satisfaction how he had witnessed senior captains and, in one instance, a chief pilot, break down and cry before the group during the final evaluation. As Jack Gordon (1989) sees it, this "personality shredding is a pretty fair description of what went on in some sensitivity training sessions, and that at least a few NEW APPROACHES TO CRM TRAINING people were seriously wounded" (p.29).
Current approaches of CRM training have Problems can occur elsewhere even when been questioned by others. John Lauber in his training does not involve such direct feedback presentation to the Annual Airline Operations as was characteristic of early sensitivity Forum, Airline Safety in a transitional era training. Following the breakup of AT&T, (November, 1988) , stated his concern that Pacific Bell instituted a corporate-wide program "some of us have fallen into the dangerous called Leadership Development. The waters of 'hot tub harmony'. What I mean by company's director of· training noted that -the -.-this is that I see signs of too much emphasis program "was a long way from sensitivity on interpersonal relationships in some of the training" (Gordon, 1989 p. 38) . Nonetheless, approaches to cockpit resource management, following complaints by some employees and and not enough emphasis on command and an investigation by the California Public Utilities leadership skills.II Doug Schwartz of Commission, the program was dropped. These FlightSafety International describes an results could have been anticipated. In an early evolution from first generation CRM programs, article advocating T-group training, Argyris which emphasized open ,communication, (1964) cautions that individuals who are highly teamwork, and advocacy, to training which will defensive should not be involved in the provide specific and measurable cockpit training.
behaviors (Hughes, 1989) . The second reason cited by Kaplan for the The foregoing criticism is not intended to failure of laboratory education is that even suggest leadership style analysis has no place when participants had a positive reaction, they in pilot education. In fact, an appreciation of frequently had difficulty applying what they had the various leadership styles can provide learned once they returned to the job. Given valuable insights into pilots. Given evidence this difficulty, positive effects are short-lived. that such attempts have not been successful in Similar criticisms have been leveled at CRM business settings, and in the absence of training. Walker and Youngblood (1989) note: explicitly defined behaviors to be used in the "Some of the existing programs rely heavily on cockpit, the question is what amount of scarce self-analysis without emphasis on actually training time should be spent in an attempt to working together or giving skills to use while modify existing pilot attitudes and leadership working in the cockpit. While self-analysis may styles. give some personal in-sight into individual
There are other elements of CRM training, styles of management, it does not deal with some old and some more recently developed, how to apply skills to working better with other which promise to be effective. crew members" (p. 56). The difficulty stems Standard Operating Procedures from an emphasis on attitudes and motivations First, the importance of strict adherence to rather than on behaviors. To be effective, existing standard operating procedures must training programs must identify behaviors be stressed. Case study of accidents, which are objective, observable, and particularly when video recreations are measurable (Luthans, Maciag, and available, should be effective. Strong flight Rosenkrantz, 1983, cited in Kirkpatrick, 1988) . operations management support is critical to Most CRM programs fail to define the cockpit the development of norms requiring the use of behaviors that should result from the training standard procedures. program.
Safety Monitor
Procedures can be developed which delegate the role of safety monitor to the non-flying pilot who should be responsible for challenging any deviation from standard procedure in much the same way that a challenge to a deviation from a stabilized approach profile is now required. There are circumstances when deviation from standard procedure· is .appropriate,. but the reasons for such a deviation must first be fully established and explained to the crew. The safety monitor would also bring to the attention of the flying pilot information critical to the safe operation of the aircraft (Bolman. 1979) .
Error Chain
Most accidents are the result of a unique series of events and errors. no one of which may be uncommon or. in isolation. would lead to an accident (Sears. 1986 ). If this lIerror chain ll could be detected and broken while in progress, accidents could be avoided. FlightSafety has developed a list of clues which may point to an error chain in progress (Table 2) (Schwartz, 1989) . Decision Processes Although decision making is frequently mentioned in CRM training. the actual process is seldom more than superficially explored. It seems an assumption has been made that if sufficient openness in the cockpit can be instilled. good decisions will certainly follow. Many decisions in aviation are highly structured and programmable. consequently No one flying the aircraft 5.
No one looking out window 6.
Use of undocumented procedure 7. Violating minimums and/or li.mitations 8.
Unresolved discrepancy 9.
Failure to meet targets 1o. Departure from standard operating procedure 11 . Communication failure Source: Schwartz (1989) detailed procedures exist for most mechanical problems. But pilots also occasionally face non-programmable decisions which are left to pilot judgment. The aviation community has generally felt that pilot judgment is either innate in good pilots or acquired over time, but were not a proper subject of formal training (Buch and Diehl. 1984 ).
This attitude is in contrast to business management training which devotes considerable effort to developing business judgment. Understanding the classical decision model and practice in its application to aviation problems can be effective. CONCLUSION CRM is not the only avenue being explored to improve the safety of air travel. The newest generation of commercial aircraft make extensive use of computers to automate functions which heretofore required pilot control. Though the introduction of high levels of automation presents new cockpit management problems (Wiener. 1989) . there is reason to believe that these newer aircraft will be safer. Since pilot error continues to a major contributor to commercial aircraft accidents. work to improve the human system holds the greatest promise for improving airline safety. Formal CRM training is more than ten years old and has been adopted by most airlines. Preliminary research results indicate the training is effective in improving cockpit management behaviors. There is no research on the relative effectiveness of various approaches to CRM training, but there are reasons to question whether approaches which emphasize assessment and modification of leadership styles through group exercises will be effective. Until research results are available, CRM training should de-emphasize the study of leadership styles so that other promising approaches to training can be included. Gerald N. Cook, a Boeing 737 captain and aviation technology, both from Purdue check airman at Midway Airlines in Chicago, IL University, Captain Cook is currently pursuing recently returned to line flying after six years as a Doctorate in Business Administration at Nova Boeing chief pilot. -With a Master of Science in " , . University, Fort Lauderdale, FL. management and a Bachelor of Science in
